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Abstract
We consider second-price and ﬁrst-price auctions in the symmetric inde-
pendent private values framework. We modify the standard model by the
assumption that the bidders have reference-based utility, where a publicly
announced reserve price has some inﬂuence on the reference point. It turns
out that the seller’s optimal reserve price is increasing in the number of
bidders. Also in contrast to the standard model, we ﬁnd that secret reserve
prices can outperform public reserve prices, and that setting the optimal
reserve price can be more valuable for the seller than attracting additional
bidders.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years, theorists have begun to use the standard tools of microeco-
nomics to explore the implications of assumptions on human behavior based
on insights imported from psychology.1 One of the most prominent depar-
tures from the standard economic paradigm is the assumption that people
have reference-based utility; i.e., they assess utilities in comparison with ref-
erence points (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman,
1991). In this paper, we investigate how the analysis of the standard model
of second-price and ﬁrst-price auctions changes if the reserve price (i.e., min-
imum bid) announced by the seller has some (possibly very small) inﬂuence
on what the potential buyers perceive as a reference point. It turns out that
our model has interesting implications that may help to explain features
of real auctions (e.g., secret reserve prices) that have escaped the standard
analysis.
We consider the well-known symmetric independent private values model
with risk-neutral agents, which is the simplest framework in which auctions
have been analyzed. We assume that if a bidder wins the object and has
to make a payment t, then his utility is given by v − t − ε[t − ρ],w h e r ev
is the bidder’s intrinsic valuation, ρ is the reference point, and ε is a small
positive number. The case ε =0corresponds to the standard model in the
auction literature. We are interested in the implications of the case ε > 0,
which captures the disutility (or utility) that a buyer perceives if he has to
pay more (or less) than the reference point. The reference point can de-
pend on various exogenous parameters such as selling prices in auctions of
related items, estimates delivered by auction house experts, etc. Yet, if the
seller publicly announces a reserve price, it is plausible to assume that this
announcement also has some inﬂuence on the reference point. Empirically,
the fact that reserve prices in auctions are indeed perceived by bidders as
reference points has recently been shown in ﬁeld studies as well as in lab-
oratory experiments (see Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc, 2003; Ariely and
1In a recent survey article, Rabin (2002) has called this new movement “second-wave
behavioral economics,” because it goes beyond simply pointing out problems with standard
economic assumptions.
2Simonson, 2003; Kamins, Drèze, and Folkes, 2004).2 Hence, we model the
reference point as a convex combination of an exogenous parameter x and
the reserve price r,w h e r et h ew e i g h tt h a ti sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h er e s e r v ep r i c e
is positive but maybe very small.
It turns out that in our setting with publicly announced reserve prices,
ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions are revenue-equivalent, which is in ac-
cordance with the standard model. Yet, a remarkable result of the standard
analysis is that the optimal reserve price does not depend on the number
of bidders (see Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981). In contrast, we
will show that if there is a reference-point eﬀect, then the optimal reserve
price is increasing in the number of bidders. In our setting, the reserve price
has a positive eﬀect on a bidder’s willingness-to-pay. Of course, making the
reserve price larger always has the disadvantage of increasing the probability
that there will be no trade, but this probability is decreasing in the number
of bidders. Hence, the optimal reserve price will rise if the number of bidders
goes up. This ﬁnding is consistent with a recent empirical study conducted
by Reiley (2005), who reports results from a ﬁeld experiment suggesting
that the optimal reserve price may indeed be increasing in the number of
bidders.3
In practice, reserve prices are often kept secret. In his description of
how real auctions work for wine and art, Ashenfelter (1989) points out that
auction houses such as Christie’s and Sotheby’s usually do not reveal reserve
prices. In a study of online auctions, Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) ﬁnd that
secret reserve prices may lead to larger revenues than public minimum bids
set at the same level.4 These observations are a puzzle from the perspective
2In their ﬁeld study, Häubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2003) emphasize that the seller-
speciﬁed reserve price remains to be relevant, even if objective reference prices such as
published catalog values are available.
3Reiley (2005) points out that more experiments are needed to provide cleaner tests
of this hypothesis, which we also consider to be very desirable in the light of the novel
theory that we are proposing.
4Also studying online auctions, Katkar and Reiley (2005) ﬁnd that keeping reserve
prices secret can make sellers worse oﬀ. The ambiguity in the empirical results is com-
patible with our theory, since in our model it will depend on the parameter constellation
whether or not secret reserve prices are more proﬁtable than public reserve prices.
3of the standard analysis.5 In a second-price auction, it should not matter
whether or not a reserve price is kept secret (the bidders always have a
dominant strategy to bid their true valuation, see Riley and Samuelson,
1981), while in a ﬁrst-price auction, the seller’s revenue is in general strictly
larger if the reserve price is made public (see Elyakime et al., 1994).6 In
contrast, in our model the seller’s revenue may well be larger if she keeps the
reserve price secret, both in second-price and ﬁrst-price auctions. Intuitively,
if the exogenous factors that inﬂuence the reference point are relatively large,
then the announcement of a reserve price (which has to be small enough so
that the no-trade outcome is not triggered too often) reduces the reference
point and hence the bidders’ willingness-to-pay.7
Another novel conclusion that can be drawn from our analysis deals with
the relative advantages of auctions and negotiations as discussed by Bulow
and Klemperer (1996). They argue that an auction with no reserve price
and n +1bidders is always more proﬁtable than an optimally-structured
negotiation (modelled as an auction with an optimal reserve price) with
n bidders. Hence, standard models cannot explain why negotiations are
sometimes restricted to a few bidders even if this allows the seller to maintain
control of the negotiation process (i.e., to credibly commit to a reserve price).
In other words, even if dealing with more bidders means that the seller loses
her commitment power, in the standard model she is always better oﬀ with
at least one additional bidder. We show that this result does no longer
hold in the presence of a reference point eﬀect. Our model has the intuitive
property that an additional bidder can be less valuable for the seller than
her ability to optimally structure the selling mechanism. Thus, in contrast
to the standard theory, our model is consistent with “lock-up” agreements
5See, however, Vincent (1995) and Horstmann and LaCasse (1997), who argue that
under certain circumstances secret reserve prices may be advantageous in common-value
auctions.
6In a ﬁrst-price auction, the optimal bids depend on the reserve price. Intuitively, not
making the reserve price public is as if it were chosen simultaneously with the buyers’ bids;
i.e., the seller just does not make use of the fact that she can be a “Stackelberg leader.”
7In the empirical literature, Kaiser and Kaiser (1999) and Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003)
report that secret reserve prices seem to be more useful to sellers when the goods being
auctioned have higher book values. This empirical regularity is consistent with our theory
when higher book values are reﬂected in relatively larger values of x.
4that rule out negotiations with additional potential acquirers.8
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper in the literature
on auction theory in which the implications of reference-based utility are
explored in a formal model. Our paper makes a contribution to a growing
literature that incorporates behavioral assumptions into standard economic
analysis and studies their consequences. Papers that are thus related in
spirit include the recent work on the implications of inequity aversion, fair-
ness, ethics, and honesty in agency and mechanism design theory (see e.g.
Alger and Ma, 2003; Alger and Renault, 2005; Chen, 2000; Deneckere and
Severinov, 2003; Matsushima, 2002).9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the
model is introduced and the equilibrium strategies in second-price and ﬁrst-
price auctions are discussed. In Section 3, the seller’s optimal reserve price
is characterized and comparative statics results are provided. Our model is
applied in order to derive novel results regarding secret reserve prices and
the value of additional bidders in Section 4. Concluding remarks follow in
Section 5. Some technical details have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a monopolistic seller who has a single, indivisible object for sale,
that she cannot use herself. There are n potential buyers. The seller con-
ducts a (second-price or ﬁrst-price) sealed-bid auction with reserve price r,
which means that a bidder participating in the auction must at least bid r.
If buyer i does not win the auction, his utility is given by zero. If buyer i
wins the object and must pay the price ti a c c o r d i n gt ot h er u l e so ft h ea u c -
tion, then his utility is given by vi − ti − ε[ti − ρ],w h e r evi ∈ [0,1] denotes
his intrinsic valuation. The case ε =0is the usual case analyzed in the auc-
tion literature. A positive (but possibly very small) ε captures the reference
point eﬀect as discussed in the introduction. Speciﬁcally, the reference point
8As Bulow an Klemperer (1996) concede, under dominant U.S. takeover law “lock-up”
provisions are in fact allowed if the board is acting in the shareholders’ interests and the
price attained is high enough.
9For further references on psychology and economics, see also Tirole (2002), Rabin
(2002), Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), and Fehr and Schmidt (2003).
5is given by ρ = λr +( 1− λ)x,w h e r ex ∈ [0,1] is an exogenous parameter
(e.g., reﬂecting selling prices in auctions of related items, estimates delivered
by auction house experts, etc.) and λ ∈ [0,1] denotes the weight attached
to the announced reserve price.
Buyer i’s type vi is the realization of a random variable ˜ vi.E a c h˜ vi is
independently and identically distributed on the unit interval. The distribu-
tion function F is strictly increasing and the diﬀerentiable density function is
denoted by f. Moreover, we make the usual monotone hazard rate assump-
tion, so that
1−F(v)
f(v) is decreasing in v.10 Only buyer i knows his realized
value vi, while the other components of the model are assumed to be com-
mon knowledge. Each agent is interested in maximizing his or her expected
payoﬀ. Hence, our analysis is directly comparable with the standard model
of the independent private values environment with symmetric bidders as
analyzed by Riley and Samuelson (1981).11
Second-price auction. In a second-price auction in which at least two
bidders participate, the buyer submitting the highest bid wins the object,
but he has to pay only the second-highest bid.12 If only one bidder partic-
ipates, he wins and has to pay the reserve price r. It is well known that in
the standard case (ε =0 ), each buyer i with vi ≥ r will participate in the
auction and bid his type vi. In the present framework with ε ≥ 0, this result
can be generalized as follows.
Proposition 1 In a second-price auction, it is a weakly dominant strategy
f o rab u y e ro ft y p ev to bid bS(v)=
v+ερ
1+ε if v ≥ ¯ v(r)=( 1+ε)r − ερ,a n d
not to participate otherwise.
Proof. Since the price for the object will at least be r,i tc a n n o tbep r o ﬁtable
for buyer i to participate if vi − r − ε[r − ρ] < 0. Thus, consider a buyer
10Hence, we are in Myerson’s (1981) “regular case,” i.e. the “virtual valuation” v−[1−
F(v)]/f(v) is increasing.
11This model has been referred to as the “benchmark model” of auction theory in the
survey article of McAfee and McMillan (1987). See also Matthews (1995), Krishna (2002),
and Menezes and Monteiro (2005).
12For completeness, if there is more than one bidder with the highest bid, let the object
go to each of them with equal probability. The same assumption can be made in the
ﬁrst-price auction. In any case, the probability of a tie will be zero.
6i with vi ≥ ¯ v(r). If buyer i bids bS(vi),h ew i n si fbS(vi) >t i,w h e r eti
is the maximum of the other bids if there are any, and ti = r otherwise.
Consider a downward deviation to some ˜ b<b S(vi).I f ti < ˜ b<b S(vi),
he still wins and pays ti.I f ˜ b<b S(vi) ≤ ti,h i sp a y o ﬀ is still zero. If
˜ b<t i <b S(vi), he now loses and gets zero, while he would have made
ap r o ﬁt vi − ti − ε[ti − ρ] by bidding bS(vi).T h i s p r o ﬁtw o u l dh a v eb e e n
positive, since ti <b S(vi)=( vi + ερ)/(1 + ε).13 Finally, a similar argument
s h o w st h a ta nu p w a r dd e v i a t i o n˜ b>b S(vi) cannot be proﬁtable.
Note that ¯ v(r)=r+ε(1−λ)(r−x), so that increasing the reserve price
can only reduce participation. The reference point eﬀect implies that a par-
ticipating buyer of type v will bid less than his valuation v (the equilibrium
bid in the standard model, where ε =0 ) whenever ρ <v . In particular, this
must be the case if the reference point is solely determined by the reserve
price (λ =1 ). Otherwise, the bids can be larger than in the standard model.
Now consider a buyer of type v ≥ ¯ v(r).L e t G(v)=F(v)n−1 denote
the probability that the values of all other buyers are smaller than v.T h e







In order to see this, note that he will only win if he has the highest value.
He then must pay r if all other buyers have types smaller than ¯ v(r),a n d
he must pay bS(w)=
w+ερ
1+ε if w ∈ (¯ v(r),v) is the highest value of the other
n − 1 buyers.
First-price auction. In a ﬁrst-price auction, the bidder with the high-
est bid wins and has to pay what he has bid. As is well known, the bidders
do not have dominant strategies in a ﬁrst-price auction. In the standard
model (ε =0 ), there is a symmetric equilibrium in which each bidder bids
less than his true type. In the present framework, this result can be gener-
alized, so that a bidder who participates in a ﬁrst price auction bids bF(v),
which is less than bS(v). More precisely, we get the following result.
13Given the tie-breaking rule of the previous footnote, if ˜ b = ti <b
S(vi),h en o wl o s e s
this positive proﬁt with probability 1/2.
14Note that ¯ v(r) can be negative, while the types are always non-negative. Formally,
F(w) and thus G(w) are identical to zero for all w ≤ 0.
7Proposition 2 In a ﬁrst-price auction, only buyers of type v ≥ ¯ v(r) will













Proof. It is obvious that buyer i cannot beneﬁt from participating if vi −
r − ε[r − ρ] < 0. Thus, consider a buyer i with vi ≥ ¯ v(r). Assume that all
other buyers follow the strategy given in the proposition. Note that bF(v) is
increasing. As a consequence, it is never proﬁtable for buyer i to bid more
than bF(1), because then he would win for sure and could increase his payoﬀ
by slightly reducing his bid. Buyer i thus considers to bid b ∈ [r,bF(1)].N o t e
that there exists a value z ∈ [¯ v(r),1] such that bF(z)=b. Hence, buyer i’s
expected payoﬀ from bidding b,w h i c hi sg i v e nb yvi −b−ε[b−ρ] times the
probability that no other buyer bids more than b, can be written as follows:
³
vi − bF(z) − ε[bF(z) − ρ]
´
G(z)








If buyer i bids bF(vi), his expected payoﬀ thus is
R vi











[G(w) − G(z)]dw ≤ 0,
it cannot be proﬁtable for buyer i to deviate from the strategy given in the
proposition.
Now consider a buyer of type v ≥ ¯ v(r).H ep a y sbF(v) if all other buyers











It is easy to check (with integration by parts) that TF(v)=TS(v),w h i c h
is in accordance with the well-known revenue equivalence principle. The
winner only pays the second-highest bid in the second-price auction, but
the equilibrium bids are lower in the ﬁrst-price auction, so that the expected
payment is the same in both cases.
83T h e o p t i m a l r e s e r v e p r i c e
In order to characterize the optimal reserve price, let us now consider the
seller’s revenue. Recall that the seller does not know the buyers’ types.
Hence, the seller’s expected revenue Π(r,λ) is simply n times the expected
value of the payment that a buyer makes to the seller (which is TF(v) if
v ≥ ¯ v(r),a n d0 otherwise).15 Clearly, the seller will only consider reserve

























Note that if ε =0 , then the seller’s expected revenue is obviously max-
imized by r = r0,w h e r er0 −
1−F(r0)
f(r0) =0 , so that the integrand is positive
whenever v ≥ r0. The following proposition characterizes the optimal re-
serve price for ε > 0.
Proposition 3 The optimal reserve price r∗ is given by
r∗ =
v∗ + ε(1 − λ)x
1+ε(1 − λ)
,

















if λ > 0 or if λ =0and εx ≤ 1/f(0).I f λ =0and εx>1/f(0),t h e n
v∗ =0 .








ελ(1 − F(¯ v(r))n) −
µ
¯ v(r) −




·nF(¯ v(r))n−1f(¯ v(r))[1 + ε(1 − λ)]
´
.
15We highlight in our notation the dependence of Π on λ for later purposes (see Section
4b e l o w ) .
9The ﬁrst-order condition can thus be written as
¯ v(r) −
1 − F(¯ v(r))
f(¯ v(r))
= ελ
1 − F(¯ v(r))n
nF(¯ v(r))n−1f(¯ v(r))
+ ε(1 − λ)
1 − F(¯ v(r))
f(¯ v(r))
−¯ v(r)ε(1 − λ) − ερ[1 + ε(1 − λ)].
The left-hand side is equal to α(¯ v(r)), while the right-hand side can be
rewritten as β(¯ v(r),n,ε).
Consider the case λ > 0. Note that given the monotone hazard rate as-
sumption, there always exists a unique v∗ > 0 as deﬁned in the proposition,
because when v m o v e sf r o mz e r ot oo n e ,α(v) strictly increases from − 1
f(0)
to 1,w h i l eβ(v,n,ε) strictly decreases from +∞ to −(1−λ)(1+ε)xε−ε < 0
(the fact that β is decreasing in v follows from the monotone hazard rate
property and Lemma 1 in the Appendix). Due to continuity, a straightfor-
ward intermediate value argument can thus be applied. The optimal reserve
price must be such that ¯ v(r) < 1 and such that ¯ v(r) > 0 (note that
dΠ(r,λ)
dr is
strictly positive if r ≤
ε(1−λ)x
1+ε(1−λ)). Since v∗ (and thus r∗, which is implicitly
given by ¯ v(r∗)=v∗) is unique and since there must be an interior solution,
Π(r,λ) must attain its maximum at r = r∗.F i n a l l y ,i fλ =0 , it is straight-
forward to see that there can be a corner solution at v∗ =0 , which happens
if εx>1/f(0).
We can now analyze the comparative statics properties of our model. In
particular, it turns out that the optimal reserve price r∗ is increasing in the
number of bidders, provided that the reserve price has at least some inﬂuence
on the reference point. This result is in stark contrast to the standard result,
which says that the optimal reserve price r0 is independent of the number
of bidders.16 In the standard model (ε =0 ), the reserve price has only
an indirect eﬀect on the seller’s expected proﬁt Π(r,λ), because it merely
changes the critical valuation below which a buyer does not participate. In
contrast, in our model the reserve price also has a direct positive eﬀect on
Π(r,λ) through the reference point ρ. The more bidders there are, the higher
is the expected value of the highest type. Hence, a given reserve price will
16Notice that our model could be re-interpreted as a modiﬁcation of the standard model,
where the winner must pay ti + ε[ti − ρ] instead of ti.I f t h e p a y m e n t ε[ti − ρ] accrued
to the seller, revenue equivalence between our modiﬁed auction and the standard auction
would imply that r
∗ is independent of n. However, in our framework ε[ti − ρ] is not paid
to the seller, so that her incentives are diﬀerent.
10less likely lead to the no-trade outcome if the number of bidders is increased,
so that increasing the reserve price due to the direct reference point eﬀect
becomes relatively more attractive.
Proposition 4 The optimal reserve price r∗ is increasing in the number of
bidders for all λ > 0. The optimal reserve price is independent of n if λ =0 .




αv(v∗)−βv(v∗,n,ε) > 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives.17
The denominator is positive, since the monotone hazard rate assumption
implies αv > 0, and we already know that βv < 0 (see Lemma 1 in the
Appendix). Moreover, it is straightforward to check that if λ > 0,t h e n
βn(v∗,n,ε)=−ελ
1 − F(v∗)n + nlnF (v∗)
n2F(v∗)n−1f(v∗)
> 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that 1−ξ+lnξ < 0 for ξ ∈ (0,1).





dn > 0.I fλ =0 ,t h e nβn(v∗,n,ε)=0and thus r∗ is independent
of n.
Next, what is the impact of the exogenous reference price x and the
weight λ that is associated with the reserve price? An increase in x unam-
biguously increases a bidder’s willingness-to-pay, so that the seller will raise
the reserve price, since a larger willingness-to-pay means that the danger of
the no-trade outcome is mitigated. An increase in λ can have ambiguous
consequences. If x is relatively small, more weight on r m e a n st h a ti tb e -
comes more attractive for the seller to increase r∗ due to the reference point
eﬀect. If x is relatively large and x becomes a less important determinant of
the reference point, it may be proﬁtable to reduce r, because ceteris paribus
the willingness-to-pay of a buyer with a given type will now be smaller, so
that the danger of the no-trade outcome becomes more relevant.
Proposition 5 The optimal reserve price r∗ is always increasing in x,b u t
need not be monotone in λ.As u ﬃcient condition for r∗ to be increasing in
λ is x ≤ v∗.
17While the number of bidders is discrete, for simplicity we formally treat n as a con-
tinuous variable.
11Proof. Consider ﬁrst the impact of the exogenous reference price x.F r o m
the deﬁnition of v∗, it follows that dv∗
dx = −
ε(1−λ)(1+ε)
αv(v∗)−βv(v∗,n,ε) ≤ 0 (because we




the optimal reserve price is increasing in x if αv(v∗) − βv(v∗,n,ε) > 1+ε,










, where the derivative of the term
in square brackets is negative.










where the inequality holds because
1−F(v)n





dλ + ε v∗−x
[1+ε(1−λ)]2, which must be positive if x ≤ v∗.
It is also interesting to analyze whether the introduction of a small refer-
ence point eﬀect (i.e., a small ε > 0) into the standard model (where ε =0 )
reduces or increases the optimal reserve price r∗. In general, r∗ will not
be monotone in ε.18 If the reference point is almost entirely determined
by the reserve price (i.e., if λ is close to 1), then making ε slightly positive
will lead to r∗ being larger than r0, because of the positive reference point
eﬀect. Yet, if λ is close to 0 and x is small, r∗ will be smaller than r0,
because the seller predominantly wants to reduce the danger of the no-trade
outcome when the preferences become reference-dependent and the (almost
exogenous) reference point is low.
Proposition 6 The introduction of a small reference point eﬀect increases
the optimal reserve price (i.e., dr∗
dε |ε=0 > 0)i fλ is suﬃciently large and
n ≥ 2, while it reduces r∗ if λ is suﬃciently small and x<r 0.




αv(v∗)−βv(v∗,n,ε). We already know that the denominator is






−(1−λ)x. The term in square brackets is positive for
18Yet, one can show that the optimal reserve price is monotonically increasing in ε if
λ =1 . To see this, note that in the proof of Proposition 6 we then have βε(v,n,ε)=
[1 − F(v)
n]/[nF(v)
n−1f(v)] − v,w h i c hi sp o s i t i v ef o rv ≤ r0.
12n ≥ 2 (because it is equal to zero for n =1and increasing in n).19 Hence,
for any given value of x we must have βε > 0 if λ is suﬃciently close to 1.
Similarly, βε < 0 for a given x>0 if λ is suﬃciently close to 0.F r o mP r o p o -
sition 3, it also follows that dr∗
dε |ε=0 = dv∗
dε |ε=0 +(1−λ)(x−r0).H e n c e ,t h e
introduction of a small reference point eﬀect into the standard model will
increase the optimal reserve price if λ is suﬃciently close to 1, while it will
decrease the optimal reserve price if λ is suﬃciently close to 0 and x<r 0.
Even though we think that small values of ε are most plausible, in order
to better understand the model it is interesting to note what happens if
ε becomes large. Suppose that λ < 1.W h e n ε goes to inﬁnity, r∗ must
converge to x, because in the limit the buyers are basically unwilling to pay
more than ρ (which rules out a minimum bid r larger than ρ) and the seller
can increase her proﬁtb yi n c r e a s i n gr if it is smaller than ρ.I fλ =1 ,i nt h e
limit a buyer will never be willing to pay more than r,s ot h eo p t i m a lr e s e r v e
price converges to the price posted by a proﬁt-maximizing seller who can
only use a ﬁxed-price mechanism. Such a seller will set a price p in order
to maximize her expected proﬁt p[1 − F(p)n], which is the price times the
probability that there is at least one buyer willing to pay the price. The
ﬁrst-order condition is 1−F(p∗)n −p∗nF(p∗)n−1f(p∗)=0 .F o r m a l l y ,w h e n
ε goes to inﬁnity, inspection of Proposition 3 immediately reveals that v∗
must converge to zero (so that r∗ converges to x)i fλ < 1,a n dv∗ = r∗
converges to p∗ if λ =1 .
Remark 1 It should be emphasized that even if ε is very small, the impact
of the reference point eﬀect on the optimal reserve price r∗ can be signiﬁcant
i ft h en u m b e ro fp o t e n t i a lb u y e r si ss u ﬃciently large. For example, consider
the uniform distribution, so that r0 =0 .5. Assume that ε =0 .01;i . e . ,t h e
reference point eﬀect is quite small. If λ =1 , the optimal reserve price
for n =3is only slightly increased to r∗ ≈ 0.503,b u tf o rn =3 0it is
signiﬁcantly increased to r∗ ≈ 0.774.
Finally, note that our results are relevant even if the reserve price has
19Note that in the special case n =1and λ =1 , the optimal reserve price does not
depend on ε.I nt h i sc a s e ,ρ = r and the bidder has to pay r if he gets the object, so that
we are back in the standard model regardless of ε.
13only a very small inﬂuence on what the buyers perceive as a reference point.
As an illustration, let λ =0 .01 i nt h ee x a m p l em e n t i o n e di nR e m a r k1 .T h e
optimal reserve price in the case of thirty bidders is now between r∗ ≈ 0.665
(if x =0 )a n dr∗ ≈ 0.674 (if x =1 ), which is still quite diﬀerent from the
standard result r0.
4A p p l i c a t i o n s
4.1 Secret reserve prices
In the previous section we have characterized the optimal reserve price r∗
under the assumption that the seller publicly announces the reserve price.
Now consider what happens if the seller keeps the reserve price secret. In
this case, it can no longer inﬂuence the bidders’ reference point, which is
now entirely determined by the exogenous reference price x.N o t e t h a t i n
a second-price auction, it is still a dominant strategy for a buyer of type v
to bid bS(v)=v+εx
1+ε , so that the seller’s expected revenue is now given by
Π(r,0). Hence, the optimal reserve price can be derived as in the previous
section. In stark contrast to the standard model (see Riley and Samuelson,
1981), it turns out that the seller’s expected revenue may well be larger if
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< 0,
which is the case whenever x>r ∗,o re q u i v a l e n t l yx>v ∗.I f Π(r∗,λ) is
decreasing in λ, the seller’s expected proﬁt attains its maximum at λ =0






∗)) is increasing in n (see the proof of Proposition 4).
14(which corresponds to the case of a secret reserve price). Thus, if this
condition is satisﬁed,21 then the seller is strictly better oﬀ if she keeps the
reserve price secret, regardless of the weight λ > 0 with which a publicly
announced reserve price enters the bidders’ reference point.
If the reserve price is kept secret, ﬁrst-price auctions and second-price
auctions are no longer revenue-equivalent. Note that in a ﬁrst-price auc-
tion the bids depend on the reserve price (see Proposition 2). Consider
now the case of a secret reserve price, so that the reference point is en-
tirely determined by x. If a bidder of type v believes that the seller has










. Consider a bidder of type v whose bid lies
above r. From the seller’s point of view, the expected payment of the bid-
der is ˆ TF(v)=ˆ bF(v)G(v), which (in contrast to TS(v), the payment she
would expect from the bidder in a second-price auction) does not depend on
the level of r actually set by the seller. Let ˆ v(r) be such that ˆ bF(ˆ v(r)) = r.
The seller’s expected proﬁtt h e ni sn
R 1
ˆ v(r)ˆ bF(v)G(v)dF(v),w h i c hi so b v i -
ously maximized if ˆ v(r)=0 . In equilibrium the condition ˆ r = r must be
satisﬁed, so the seller’s expected proﬁti naﬁrst-price auction with a secret
reserve price is given by Π( εx
1+ε,0). Since in general the reserve price thus is
not the one that maximizes Π(r,0), it follows that with secret reserve prices
the expected revenue in a ﬁrst-price auction is smaller than in a second-price
auction.22
M o r e o v e r ,e v e ni naﬁrst-price auction it is possible that the seller’s
expected revenue with a secret reserve price is larger than the one she could
attain by publicly announcing r∗. Even though it is no longer suﬃcient that
Π(r∗,λ) is decreasing in λ, the positive impact of the larger weight on x
can overcompensate the negative impact of the suboptimal secret reserve
price, if the exogenous reference price x is large. As an illustration, Figure
21Since v
∗ is increasing in λ (see the proof of Proposition 5), a suﬃcient condition for
x>v
∗ is that x is larger than v
∗ at λ =1 . For example, in the case of the uniform




1+4 ε +3 ε2¢
/(4 + 3ε),w h i c hi s
a l w a y st h ec a s ei fx>
√
3/3.
22If εx<1/f(0), the expected revenue in a ﬁrst-price auction is strictly smaller. Oth-
erwise, the expected revenues in ﬁrst-price and second-price auctions are identical (cf.
Proposition 3).
151 shows the seller’s expected proﬁts with public and secret reserve prices as
functions of x if the valuations are uniformly distributed, n =2 , ε =0 .3,
and λ =0 .5.















Figure 1. Secret reserve prices.
4.2 The value of additional bidders
In the standard auction model with ε =0 , Bulow and Klemperer (1996) have
shown that the expected proﬁt of a seller who sets an optimal reserve price
in the presence of n potential buyers is smaller than the expected proﬁto fa
seller who cannot set a reserve price when there are n +1potential buyers.
Hence, even if n is large, the marginal value of one additional bidder is
greater than the beneﬁt of setting an optimal reserve price. This striking
result is no longer true if there is a reference point eﬀect (ε > 0), given that
the number of bidders is suﬃciently large. In order to see this, note that the
seller’s proﬁt in the absence of a reserve price (i.e., if ρ is entirely determined



































16where ˜ v(2) is the second highest element of {˜ v1,...,˜ vn}.23 Notice that Π(0,0)
is increasing in n and it converges to 1+εx
1+ε < 1 if n goes to inﬁnity, for
any given ε > 0 and x<1. It is straightforward to see that Π(r∗,λ) must
increase in n and converge to 1 (this would even be the case if the seller
could only post a ﬁxed price). Hence, if n is suﬃciently large and x<1,t h e
value of an additional buyer will be smaller than the beneﬁt from setting
the optimal reserve price. In contrast to the standard model, the present
analysis can thus explain why restricting the number of bidders (when this
makes commitment to a reserve price more credible, as has been supposed
by Bulow and Klemperer, 1996) can indeed be proﬁtable for the seller.24
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have shown that prominent results of the by now standard private in-
dependent values model of auctions with symmetric bidders are not robust
when the bidders’ utilities are inﬂuenced by a (possibly very small) refer-
ence point eﬀect. Optimal reserve prices may be quite diﬀerent from what
standard theory prescribes,25 they may well be increasing in the number of
bidders, and keeping them secret can be proﬁtable. The value of additional
bidders might be smaller than has previously been thought.
It could be an interesting avenue for future research to analyze other
selling mechanisms when utilities are reference-dependent. In the standard
model, the revelation principle allows us to maximize over the (inﬁnitely
large) class of all conceivable mechanisms, because every mechanism is equiv-
alent to a suitably chosen direct revelation mechanism. Hence, optimal
mechanisms can be characterized that cannot be improved upon. It is ques-
23Thus, the distribution function of ˜ v(2) is Pr{˜ v(2) ≤ v} = F(v)
n+nF(v)
n−1(1−F(v)),
and the density function is n(n − 1)F(v)
n−2f(v)(1 − F(v)).
24Of course, the ﬁnding of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) is valid if the number of potential
buyers and the reference point eﬀect are suﬃciently small. For example, let v be uniformly
distributed, x =0 .1,a n dλ =0 .9. Then the expected proﬁt with the optimal reserve price
and n =2is smaller than the expected proﬁt with no reserve price and n =3if ε < ˆ ε,
with ˆ ε ≈ 0.35.
25Note that increasing reserve prices over and above the usually prescribed levels has
also been suggested in the literature on bidding rings, see Graham and Marshall (1987)
and Mailath and Zemsky (1991).
17tionable whether this approach is convincing from a behavioral economics
perspective.26 In particular, we think that in our context the relevant ref-
erence point in general cannot be independent of the auction format. For
example, while in the standard model an optimal reserve price is equivalent
to an optimal entry fee, this does not need to be the case in our model. Fu-
ture experimental studies might help to ﬁnd out how the weights attached to
reserve prices and entry fees diﬀer. Similarly, the starting price of a Dutch
auction might inﬂuence the reference point. In particular, the reference
point might be adapted during the oral bidding process in an open auction
format, which may well help to explain the phenomenon known as bidding
fever, which is a puzzle for the standard analysis. Moreover, in sequential
auctions it might be a good idea to start with more expensive goods, because
the price obtained in period t might inﬂuence the reference point in period
t +1 .
It could also be an interesting topic for future research to incorporate
other insights from behavioral economics into auction theory. For example,
the endowment eﬀect, according to which ownership of an object appears
to increase one’s valuation, might have an interesting impact on auction
models with resale opportunities.27 In our view, exploring the implications
of departures from standard economic paradigms seems to be an exciting
and promising task for auction theorists.
26Indeed, many experiments have shown that framing eﬀects are highly important.
Hence, what is equivalent in traditional economic theory does not need to be equivalent in
the view of real people. See Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and Kahneman and Tversky
(1984) with regard to framing and cf. also Masatlioglu and Uler (2004), who show a related
point in an auction experiment.
27For instance, Zheng (2002) has shown that the optimal allocation derived by Myerson
(1981) can under certain circumstances also be achieved when the bidders cannot commit
not to resell. Yet, this requires resale to take place, which is less probable to happen if
there is an endowment eﬀect. But if the endowment eﬀect is suﬃciently strong, we are
again in the world of Myerson (1981). Hence, small endowment eﬀects might be the most
damaging ones from the seller’s viewpoint.
18Appendix
Lemma 1 The term
1−F(v)n
nF(v)n−1f(v) is strictly decreasing in v for all v ∈ (0,1).












−(1 − F(v)n)((n − 1)F(v)n−2f(v)2 + F(v)n−1f0(v))
i
is negative. In order to see that this is indeed the case, multiply with
[F(v)n−1f(v)]2 1 − F(v)
[1 − F(v)n]F(v)n−1 > 0,








f(v)2 − (1 − F(v))f0(v) < 0.
Since f(v)2+(1−F(v))f0(v) > 0 due to the monotone hazard rate assump-











(1 − F(v))(−nF(v)n − (n − 1)(1 − F(v)n)) + (1 − F(v)n)F(v)
(1 − F(v)n)F(v)
f(v)2




where the inequality follows from the fact that the term in square brackets is
(increasing in v and thus) always smaller than 1−F(1)n −n(1−F(1)) = 0.
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